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CONSTRUCTING SIKKIMESE NATIONAL IDENTITY 
IN THE 1960s AND 1970s 
JACKIE HILTZ 
Seattle 
A generation has elapsed since Sikkim was annexed by India. Yet 
symbolic remnants from its former life as a semi-independent Buddhist 
kingdom linger: the election system reserves twelve seats for the 
minority Bhutia-Lepcha community; the Sikkim national flag decorates 
the rear windows of vehicles plying the steep streets of Gangtok; I and 
the towering, five-peaked Mount Kangchendzonga still stirs the hearts 
of Sikkimese from government bureaucrats in the capital to cardamom 
cultivators in remote hamlets. These legacies hark back to the 1960s 
and 1970s when the last Chogyal, or king of Sikkim, Palden Thondup 
Namgyal (1923-1981), and others led domestic efforts to create and 
shape a national identity for the kingdom, namely, an identity embraced 
by the multi-ethnic people of Sikkim and accepted as the foundation for 
a collective interest. Concurrently, the Chogyal strove to carve out a 
distinct international identity for Sikkim, specifically, a political 
presence on the world stage clarifying his country's status as an 
independent entity that enjoyed special treaty relations with India. 
In their seminal texts on the creation of nationalism, Eric 
Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson argue that national identity is 
"invented" or "constructed.,,2 The process, usually directed by the 
educated elite, serves to advance the interests of the nation and 
encourage allegiance to it. This perspective is the lens through which I 
shall examine Sikkimese efforts in the 1960s and early 1970s to craft 
and promote a distinct identity. There are many forms and purposes of 
identity construction, but this article will focus on the political and 
cultural components of domestic and international identity formation in 
Sikkim, and mainly considers pertinent developments in the capital 
Gangtok, the administrative and political centre of Sikkim and the 
I up until at least the spring of 1999, the national flag of Sikkim fluttered over 
the Palace in Gangtok. 
2 See Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds, The Invention of Tradition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and 
Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), and Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections 
on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991). 
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district with the largest concentration of educated Sikkimese. The drive 
to create a distinct, recognized identity for Sikkim, I argue, was spurred 
by the intersection of two forces, the era of decolonization and the 
personality and experiences of Chogyal Paid en Thondup Namgyal. It 
was shaped by two overarching challenges: I) forging a shared identity 
out of a multi-ethnic society, and 2) convincing the world community 
of the separate political identity ofSikkim. 
In this article I suggest that the seeds of an articulated national 
consciousness took root in Sikkim due to the efforts of the last Chogyal 
and others. Yet the terrain upon which the seeds were sown has 
radically shifted. An examination of the experiment of the 1960s and 
early 1970s together with a recognition of the changed political 
circumstances in Sikkim, point to timely questions: how might the 
Sikkimese people continue to imagine and assert their unique identity 
within the framework of the Indian union? And, more generally, how 
might a stateless people keep alive and flourishing their distinct 
character when they are a minority in a large nation-state? 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The early history of Sikkim reads like waves of bloody attacks from the 
east and west.3 Bhutan and Nepal plundered hamlets and the capital, 
and seized chunks of Sikkimese territory, altering its borders forever. It 
was the East India Company that, in 1817, with the Treaty of Titalya, 
put an end to the devastating raids. Through this treaty the British 
government gained a permanent foothold in Sikkim. Over the course of 
the nineteenth century, the three Himalayan kingdoms came to function 
as a buffer zone for the British Raj, a mountainous bulwark protecting 
India from the Chinese and Russian empires. In an arrangement that 
suited British India, the exact terms of its relationships with the three 
states were never completely spelled out.4 Sikkim was destined, 
however, to emerge as the lynchpin for British aspirations to "open" 
Tibet and so was brought more closely into the political orbit of the 
British colonial system than either Nepal or Bhutan. 
Sikkim possesses what has been described as the "single most 
strategically important piece of real estate in the entire Himalayan 
3 Incursions from Bhutan began in 1700, and the first clash between the Namgyal 
and Shah (Nepal) dynasties occurred in 1778. 
4 Leo E. Rose, "India and Sikkim: Redefining the Relationship," Pacific Affairs, 
voL XLII, no. 1 (Spring 1969): 32. 
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range."s Sikkim's Natu La and Jelep La, two 14,000-foot-plus passes 
descending into Tibet's Chumbi Valley, provide one of the easiest 
passage through the vertical reaches of the Himalayas and have 
invested Sikkim with a geopolitical importance disproportionate to its 
tiny size. In the late 1800s as the British became involved in the "Great 
Game" with Russia and increasingly keen to expand commercial 
interests north of the Himalayas, Sikkim was transformed into a 
protectorate of British India. The Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1890 gave 
the British government exclusive control over the internal 
administration and foreign relations of the kingdom.6 For almost twenty 
years, the British directly administered Sikkim and in 1908 restored the 
internal administration to its ruler. The exact political standing of 
Sikkim remained ambiguous; that is, "Sikkim was never a feudatory 
'Native State' ... but neither was it independent or entirely 
autonomous.,,7 Two things, however, were clear: Sikkim was more 
limited in its internal and external affairs than either Bhutan or Nepal; 
and the ambiguity surrounding the political status of Sikkim would 
plague the kingdom in later years. In 1947 the British left India. 
Democratic India would play a large role in the future of the three 
monarchies. 
A few years later, Bhutan, Nepal, and Sikkim negotiated treaties 
with the government of India that mirrored historical relationships with 
British India and were tinged with India's anxiety over China's ancient 
claims to India's northern frontier. Because the Indo-Bhutan Treaty 
was signed in 1949 just prior to the Chinese invasion of Tibet, Bhutan 
secured very favourable terms: India recognized Bhutan's fundamental 
independence and guaranteed not to interfere in its internal affairs; 
Bhutan agreed to be "guided by the advice of the GOI [Government of 
India] in its external relations."g Nepal had remained the most 
independent of the three Himalayan states during imperial rule in India. 
Yet, even its 1950 treaty reflected India's security concerns in the 
5 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth 
Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 167. 
6 Formal relations between British India and Sikkim began with the Treaty of 
Titalya in 1817 after the conclusion of the Anglo-Gurkha War (1814-1816). The 
Tumlong Treaty of 1861 allowed the British government to intervene in the internal 
affairs ofSikkim but left the ruler of the kingdom sovereign. 
7 Rose, p. 32. 
8 Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh, Himalayan Triangle: A Historical Survey of British 
India's Relations with Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan 1765-1950 (London: British Library, 
1988), pp. 369-70. In the early 1960s India assumed responsibility for Bhutan's 
defence "by implication." 
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northern reaches of the subcontinent; in effect, India retained de facto 
control of Nepal's defence and external relations. The Indo-Sikkim 
Treaty of 1950 was the most restrictive of the three treaties: Sikkim 
remained a protectorate of democratic India with responsibility for its 
internal affairs; India looked after its defence, foreign relations, and 
communications. A three-page letter, sent by the Political Officer to the 
Palace and commonly known as the 'Exchange of Letters,' further 
defined the relationship and stated that the government of India could 
intervene in the internal administration of Sikkim "should a situation 
arise in which law and order are seriously threatened within the State.,,9 
Palden Thondup Namgyal, in his early twenties and crown prince at 
the time, negotiated the terms of Sikkim's treaty with India. As the 
second son of Chogyal Tashi Namgyal (1893-1964), he was expected 
to live in the shadow of his older brother, Paljor Namgyal, and make 
his mark in the realm of religion. Because he was the incarnation of 
two eminent Buddhist figures, Palden Thondup Namgyal received 
monastic training in Tibet. In 1933 he was installed as the head of two 
important monasteries in Sikkim. Besides his religious education in 
Tibet and Sikkim, he attended school at St Joseph's Convent in 
Kalimpong, St Joseph's College in Darjeeling, and Simla's Bishop 
Cotton School. He also spoke five languages, including English, 
fluently. His plans to study science at Cambridge were dashed when his 
brother, a member of the Royal Air Force, was killed in a plane crash in 
1941. Suddenly, Palden Thondup Namgyal found himself at the helm 
of the kingdom.1D 
Due to the changed circumstances, Namgyal attended the Indian 
Civil Service training camp in Dehra Dun. In 1963 he married an 
American, a recent graduate of Sarah Lawrence College named Hope 
Cooke. (His first wife, a Tibetan aristocrat, died in childbirth along 
with their fourth child.) By the time Palden Thondup Namgyal was 
consecrated as the twelfth Chogyal of Sikkim in 1965, he had served as 
his father's principal adviser for over twenty years, had traveled more 
than any of his predecessors, ] 1 was an honorary Lieutentant-Colonel in 
the Indian Army, and was president of the Mahabodhi Society of India, 
9 "Exchange of Letters," February 25, 1951. "See Sunanda Datta-Ray, Smash 
and Grab: Annexation ofSikkim (Delhi: Vikas, 1984), p. 61, and L.B. Basnet, Sikkim: 
A Short Political History (Delhi: Chand, 1974), p. 96. 
10 His father, Sir Tashi Namgyal, more inclined to religious and artistic matters 
than realpolitik, had virtually retired from active participation in the administration of 
the kingdom. 
J 1 Except perhaps for his uncle, Sidkeong Tulku, the tenth Chogyal. 
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an international Buddhist organization. Namgyal lived these formative 
years against the backdrop of decolonization, in the era when many 
non-self-governing territories were gaining independence from their 
colonizing powers. By the early 19605, he and others in Sikkim, 
believed that most terms of the lndo-Sikkim Treat y-Nam gya I never 
advocated exclusive Sikkimese control of defence 12-had outlived their 
purpose. It was within this context, in the period that Anderson calls 
"the last wave of nationalism," that the quest for a Sikkimese national 
identity was launched. 13 
FORGING A SHARED IDENTITY 
Sikkim evolved into a Buddhist monarchy in which a religious king, or 
Chogyal, and minority Bhutia people dominated a population 
overwhelmingly Nepali by ancestry, and Hindu by religion. Beginning 
in the 18605 and continuing over several decades, the British with 
Sikkimese collaborators settled many Nepalis in the sparsely populated 
southern and western tracts of Sikkim. This policy was driven by the 
British desire to balance the pro-Tibetan Bhutias, or Sikkimese of 
Tibetan descent, with pro-British-India Nepalis. 14 By 1891, according 
to the census, "Nepali Sikkimese" outnumbered the earliest Sikkimese 
subjects-the Lepchas, considered the first inhabitants of Sikkim, and 
the Bhutias,15 or settlers from Tibet who founded the kingdom of 
Sikkim in the mid-seventeenth century.16 Yet, in spite of ethnic and 
12 Because of Sikkim's vulnerable location, India was particularly concerned 
about defence issues in the kingdom. Concerns intensified after 1959 when China 
tightened its control over Tibet, and during the Himalayan border wars that began in 
1962 and continued as skirmishes into the late 1960s. 
13 See, Anderson, chapter 7, "The Last Wave." 
14 Despite protests from the Chogyal and the powerful Bhutia-Lepcha landlords, 
this wide scale migration continued virtually unchecked until the last part of the 
nineteenth century. 
15 Tibetan and Bhutanese migration to the area which became what we now know 
as Sikkim began in the thirteenth century. In this article I use the term "Bhutia" to 
refer to Sikkimese of Tibetan and Bhutanese descent. 
16 The earliest inhabitants of Sikkim also included Limbus and Magars, 
sometimes referred to as "Tsongs" in Sikkim. There are claims that these two 
Mongolian ethnic groups originally hail from Tibet. For example, History of Sikkim 
states that the Tsong "revered the Matog Lama as their Guru, followed him from 
Tsang [Tibet] and settled with him in Sikkim," Sir Thuthob Namgyal and Yeshe 
Dolma, History of Sikkim (Unpublished typescript, 1908). p. 21. Their exact origins, 
however, have not been authoritatively established. For electoral purposes, they are 
usually lumped together with the Nepali Sikkimese. 
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religious differences, there was a cohesion among Sikkimese subjects 
that anchored them to the mountains, river valleys, and rice paddies of 
the kingdom. 
Anderson argues that the foundations of modem nationalism, or 
national identity, are embedded in cultural systems, such as dynasty or 
religious structures. I? Sikkim is no exception. Before Indian 
independence, one could argue that most Sikkimese, no matter what 
their background, were commonly attached to Sikkim as homeland 
through two phenomena: I) a deep reverence for their Buddhist ruler 
and 2) veneration of Mount Kangchendzonga or the guardian deity said 
to reside within the mountain. Although many Nepali Sikkimese 
practiced Hinduism, they felt a strong allegiance to the Chogyal 
because of the ingrained Nepalese tradition of honoring their ruler, who 
in Nepal is an incarnation of Vishnu. 18 And rock-solid Mount 
Kangchendzonga, visible from every district in Sikkim, was a constant 
reminder of a shared landscape, if not shared traditions l9• For the 
Chogyal, the daunting task of the 1960s and 1970s was to tap into those 
common attachments and expand upon them in ways that 
acknowledged the demographic shift within Sikkim and protected the 
traditional prerogatives of the Bhutia-Lepchas. 
Cultural efforts: "Tibeto-Burman" trend and textbooks 
In the summer of 1967, two Sikkimese women, Gayatri Devi Gurung 
and Chum Dorji Wongmu, traveled to Manila, where they represented 
the Sikkim Social Welfare Society, a nonpolitical but official 
organization, at a conference on women's leadership organized by the 
17 Anderson writes, "What I am proposing is that nationalism has to be 
understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with 
the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which-as well as against which-it 
came into being," p. 12. 
18 Chandra Oas Rai, retired from government service since 1983, was one of 
several Nepali Sikkimese interviewed who confirmed this. Interview, Gangtok, April 
24, 2001. It should be mentioned that some wealthy Nepali Sikkimese, mostly 
Pradhans, or members of the Newar community, owned land in both Nepal and 
Sikkim, which left them vulnerable to accusations of divided loyalties. 
19 See Anna Balikci-Oenjonpga, "Kangchendzonga: secular and Buddhist 
perceptions of the mountain deity of Sikkim among the Lhopos," Bulletin of 
Tibetology 38 (2) November 2002. She writes, 'Ozo-nga played an important role as 
a national symbol and it is said that all ethnic communities, whatever their origins and 
whether Hindu or Buddhist, used to recognise and worship Kangchendzonga if they 
considered themselves first and foremost as Sikkimese,' p. 2. 
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Associated Country Women of the World. In addition to participating 
in a seminar, the two women displayed a collection of items (or 
representations) from Sikkim including: a mask of Kangchendzonga, 
the Sikkimese national flag, a "lucky sign" thangka (religious 
painting), a yak, a mule, somba (boots), a cup and saucer, thongba 
(wooden mug for the local beer), mani (Buddhist rosary), booklets 
about Sikkimese history and society, postcards of Buddhist sages, birds 
of Sikkim, and skins of wild animals. The women also exhibited color 
slides showing the Chogyal, the Gyalmo (queen), and other members of 
the royal family; the diverse flora, fauna, and unusual natural 
environment ofSikkim; and folk dances and rituals,z° 
A consideration of the collection is illuminating. The items as 
symbols evoke the agrarian rhythms of Sikkimese society. They point 
to the profound influence of Buddhism and the distinctive role of 
landscape and nature in Sikkimese life. Finally, they underscore the 
centrality of the Namgyal dynasty, and Kangchendzonga, both as 
physical landmark and paramount deity in Sikkimese Buddhism. The 
exhibit demonstrates a self-conscious effort to single out objects that 
offered crystallized and idealized versions of what it meant to be 
Sikkimese in the late 1960s. As a whole, it reflects a constructed image 
of Sikkimese identity. For our purposes, it is useful to bear in mind that 
"images are not only self-projections, but also tools of self-creation."zl 
The collection perhaps reflects the Bhutia bias of the group's advisor, 
the Chogyal's sister, Princess Pema Choden Yapshi Phunkhang. Yet, in 
a somewhat exaggerated way, it also mirrors a cultural trend noticeable 
from at least the early 1960s. 
Hobsbawm describes "invented traditions" as "practices normally 
governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic 
nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by 
repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past." 
Invented traditions often refer to a historic past, but their continuity 
with it is "largely fictitious.,,22 Hobsbawm's concept was at play in the 
shaping of Sikkimese national identity during the 1960s. In the book 
Nations of Asia (1966), the Chogyal remarked that although two-thirds 
of the Sikkimese population speak Nepali, "(m]any in this group are 
20 Sikkim Herald, vo\. 8, no. 41, July 28, 1967. 
21 Bhikku Parekh, "Defining National Identity in a Multicultural Society" in 
People. Nation, and State: The Meaning 0/ Ethnicity and Nationalism, ed. Edward 
Mortimer (London: LB. Taurus & Co, Ltd, 1999), p. 67. 
22 Hobsbawm, The Invention o/Tradition, pp. 1-2. He also notes that "[w]here 
the old ways are alive, traditions need be neither revived nor invented," p. 7. 
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not ethnically Nepali but are of Mongoloid stoCk.,,23 The suggestion 
was that most Nepali Sikkimese are not Indo-Aryan but, rather, 
culturally Buddhist with ancestral links to "Mongolian" tribes: Gurung, 
Rai, Tamang, Newar, Limbu, and Magar, or mountain peoples, some of 
whom, generations back, had migrated from the Tibetan plateau to 
Nepal, and their ancestors, finally to Sikkim?4 Although many 
members of these tribes no longer spoke Tibetan (or a Tibeto-Burman 
dialect), or observed the customs of their forebears, the potential to 
draw upon what was perceived as the basic kinship of the tribes--one 
that dovetailed with Bhutia history and culture-provided inspiration 
for the construction of national identity. 
This idea gained some traction in Gangtok. Around the time of the 
coronation of PaIden Thondup Namgyal in 1965, the term "Tibeto-
Burman" became popular in the capital, particularly amon~ a sizable 
group of educated elite-Anderson's "intelligentsia" 5_mostly 
younger, educated bureaucrats who shared the Chogyal's vision of 
greater autonomy for Sikkim. This group of mostly government 
bureaucrats hailed from different tribal and socioeconomic 
backgrounds, embraced the notion of a Tibeto-Burman identity for 
Sikkim, and adopted Tibeto-Burman trappings, a blend of Tibetan-
inspired clothin~, food, music, and handicrafts.26 While obviously a 
linguistic term,~7 Tibeto-Burman "was understood to be a vague 
supratribal category that more or less embraced all the tribes in Sikkim 
23 Donald Wilber, ed., Nations qf Asia (New York: Hart Publishing., 1 966), pp. 
478-79. This reference appears in Leo Rose, "Modern Sikkim in an Historical 
Perspective" in Reflections on Tibetan Cuitllre, eds Lawrence Epstein et al (Lewiston, 
NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), p. 71. 
24 These groups are often referred to as "matwali" castes, or alcohol-drinkers. As 
if to echo the Chogyal, M.M. Rasaily, a retired, senior-level bureaucrat and close 
adviser to the Chogyal, told me: "Sikkimese people are different; they are of 
Mongoloid background. We are more akin to Tibetans," interview, Gangtok, March 
28,2001. Princess Bhuvnesh Kumari Patiala, the Chogyal's legal adviser from 1974, 
told me, "Not all Nepali Sikkimese were Nepalese proper. They come from the tribes. 
of the Himalayan belt," interview, December 7, 1998. Again, the subtext here is that 
many Nepali Sikkimese are culturally Buddhist. 
2S See Anderson. pp. 116-139, for a discussion of the role of the intelligentsia in 
the rise of nationalism in colonial territories. 
26 It should be noted that Sikkimese subjects were never required to wear certain 
clothes, speak a particular language. or practice foreign customs. 
27 Paradoxically, since most Nepali Sikkimese--and increasingly more Bhutia-
Lepchas--could not speak Tibetan (or the Sikkimese dialect of Tibetan, Denjongke), 
Nepali was in essence the linguafranca ofSikkim. 
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and meant 'Not Indian.",28 Supporters of this theory believed that if 
only Nepali Sikkimese with Mongolian roots could hark back to their 
ancient origins and claim them with pride, they would discover their 
affinity with the Bhutias and Lepchas.29 In this way, a united Sikkim 
could be forged and withstand Indian hegemony. While such notions 
may appear naYve or even restrictive,30 they seemed to be sincere, and 
some people in. Gangtok at least, acted upon them. The Chogyal's 
comment cited above suggests his implicit, if not explicit, support of 
these efforts. 
Education31 
As Anderson points out, the educational system of a nation is often 
used to promote a shared history, culture, and language among its 
youth.32 The quest for a national identity in Sikkim led to a review and 
transformation of primary education. Prior to 1967 no coherent 
program or policy for grades kindergarten through eight existed in 
28 Hope Cooke, Time Change: An Autobiography (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1980), p. 130. Cooke writes that most Gangtokers were unsure of the 
precise meaning of"Tibeto-Burman." 
29 Ibid., pp. 129-30. 
30 Many critics have argued that forging a common identity in Sikkim was 
unattainable, or that it was not desired by the Chogyal. For example, the 
anthropologist T.B. Subba writes, "The Buddhist theocratic and hereditary rulers 
there [in Sikkim] did not allow such groups to come together nor did they recognise 
the cultural, linguistic, and religious heterogeneity within the so-called Nepalis. To 
them, such communities were basically 'migrants' from Nepal, Hindu by religion and 
'troublesome as neighbours'" (Subba, The Politics of Culture: A Study of Three 
Kirata Communities in the Eastern Himalayas [Chennai: Orient Longman, 1999], p. 
2). Former dewan Nari Rustomji writes that the differences between the Nepali 
Sikkimese and the Bhutias and Lepchas, most significantly the "rigidities of the caste 
system," were substantial, implying that finding a common identity would have been 
next to impossible. See Rustomji, Sikkim: A Himalayan Tragedy New Delhi: Allied 
Publishers, 1987, p. 16. Leo Rose writes of the large Nepali Sikkimese population as 
"essentially indigestible" and presenting "a persistent political crisis." See Rose, 
"Modern Sikkim," p. 70. 
31 This section is based on discussions with Sikkimese involved in educational 
efforts during this time, including Santosh Kumar Bardewa, who wrote the Nepali 
textbooks; and a paper, "Development of Curriculum and Textbooks Grades 
Kindergarten- VIII in Sikkim 1967-1973," by Hope Cooke Namgyal, Columbia 
University Teachers College, 1977. Namgyal was the chairman of the textbook and 
curriculum committee. 
32 Anderson, pp. 113-14. 
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Sikkim.33 Education hinged on rote learning and memorization; 
textbooks, when available, came from India and did not contain any 
Sikkim-specific material. In 1967 a "textbook and curriculum 
committee" was established; its goals were to "define and develop 
educational goals and curriculum" for grades K-8 and to make 
education "more suitable to the special conditions and character of 
Sikkim." Over the next five years, in addition to extensive teacher 
training, textbooks were produced for social studies (including books 
on community studies, Sikkimese history, geography, and nature 
studies 1-8), English (readers based on Sikkimese folks tales and 
literature 1-8), and the three mother tongue languages (primers 1-3 and 
readers 1-8). 
In Sikkim the complicated issue of language posed challenges for 
the educational system. English was the official language in this small 
country where people spoke three distinct languages-Denjongke (a 
Sikkimese dialect of Tibetan), Lepcha, and NepaIi-but in fact, Nepali 
was the unofficial lingua franca. In grades ] -3, children were to be 
instructed in their mother tongue, with English taught as a second 
language, but in reality, this was rarely the case as most schools were 
understaffed. For reasons too detailed to go into here, English was the 
medium of instruction in schools after third grade. Since English 
continued to be used for most of the grades even after the review, the 
committee amplified efforts to make the content of what the children 
studied "more relevant, more Sikkimese." The commh~t~e developed an 
archive of Sikkimese material for the textbooks through the efforts of 
teams of high school students. Armed with tape recorders, the 
volunteers fanned out across the most remote reaches of the kingdom to 
collect Sikkimese myths, folk tales, and music from every possible 
ethno-linguistic group, which were then translated into the three 
national languages of Sikkim. In this way, "all the children, although 
studying different langua§es would absorb a shared frame of reference 
on their national culture." 4 
33 In 1960,9,700 students were enrolled in 117 lower primary schools (grades 1-
3),47 upper primary schools (grades 4-5), 13 middle schools (grades 6-8) , and 5 high 
schools. By 1975, 20,959 students were enrolled in 52 lower primary, 176 upper 
primary schools, 29 junior high schools, and seven higher/senior secondary schools. 
Amal Datta, Sikkim Since Independence: A Study of Impact of Education and 
Emerging Class Structure (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1991), p. 41, 50. 
34 The social studies series for early grades was titled "Tashi, Mohan, and Kipu," 
which are common first names in the three main ethnic groups of Sikkim. The series 
was illustrated with professional photographs of three Sikkimese children, as the 
series namesake, acting out daily life in Sikkim. 
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Political efforts: parity and citizenship 
While there may have been sincere, if visionary efforts, in Gangtok to 
build a shared Sikkimese identity, the complicated electoral system in 
Sikkim heightened the basic differences between the two main 
communities. Established under the "guidance" of the government of 
India and initiated with the election ofthe first Sikkim Council in 1953, 
the election system divided the electorate into Bhutia-Lepcha and 
Nepali Sikkimese constituencies, reserved seats in the Sikkim Council 
for these communities, and required a weighted voting system for the 
reserved seats. Each community received equal representation in the 
elected government-even though the Bhutia-Lepchas now only 
comprised less than thirty percent of the population. To win a seat, the 
candidate had to secure the most votes from his own community and in 
addition, at least fifteen percent of votes from the other community. 
Eventually, parity through seat distribution was extended to the entire 
administration. The two communities were represented equally in the 
Sikkim Council, the State Cabinet, and in secretary posts of the state 
government. 35 
The introduction of the electoral system in ] 953 obligated the 
Chogyal and his advisers to begin the process of defining Sikkimese 
citizenship for the first time.36 It would take eight years and several 
drafts before they produced a "Sikkim Subjects Regulation" mutually 
agreeable to the Palace and the main political parties. Once a person's 
name made the Register of Sikkim Subjects, the person was regarded as 
Sikkimese37 and guaranteed legal rights, such as voting. Although 
there was vigorous debate over elements in the draft considered hostile 
to the NepaJi Sikkimese, a compromise was reached, and eventually the 
Regulation was deemed acceptable.38 
35 Jigme N. Kazi, Inside Sikkim: Against the Tide (Gangtok: Hill Media 
Publications, 1993), p. 222. 
36 According to Leo Rose, the failure to do this earlier may have been due in part 
to Sikkim's status as protectorate of the British and, later, Indian governments. Rose, 
unpublished manuscript, p. 97. 
37 The Sikkim Subjects Regulation, July 3, 1961, p. 7. The three categories 
defined by the regulation were: 1) persons living in Sikkim since 1946; 2) persons not 
domiciled in Sikkim but of Lepcha, Bhutia, or Tsong origin whose father or 
grandfather was born in Sikkim; 3) persons not domiciled in Sikkim but whose 
ancestors were deemed to be Sikkimese subjects before 1850. 
38 Leo Rose, unpublished manuscript, p. 172. 
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As all communities in Sikkim eventually consented to the criteria 
for citizenship, they, too, agreed in essence to the parity system. 39 
Parity was justified on the principle that it would be unfair to deny the 
Bhutia-Lepcha minority, the earliest inhabitants of Sikkim, at least 
equal status with the more recent immigrant groups. Some sources 
close to the Chogyal believe that he viewed the parity system as an 
interim solution, that once all Sikkimese recognized their common 
destiny and saw themselves first as Sikkimese, the need for parity 
would dissolve.40 But that would take time-and some safeguards to 
protect against the submersion of Bhutia-Lepcha interests by the 
majority Nepali Sikkimese. Others contend that parity was a deliberate 
strategy "manufactured to protect the interests of the minority" 
indefinitely and that it emphasized and widened the divisions between 
the two main communities.41 One thing is definite: the system itself 
became a valid point of contention and ultimately undercut efforts at 
creating a common identity. 
The principle of parity was also applied to situations outside of 
politics. The choice of delegates attending the Manila conference of 
1967 is an example. Gayatri Devi Gurung and Chum Dorji Wongmu 
respectively hailed from the NepaJi Sikkimese and the Bhutia-Lepcha 
communities. In other domains, such as education, employment, and 
cultural life, an unofficial policy of equal representation was generally 
followed. For instance, the Tashi Namgyal Academy in Gangtok, a 
public high school for boys, offered three scholarships for Bhutia-
Lepcha boys and three for "Sikkimese students ofNepali origin.,,42 
THE QUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION 
Interlinked with the construction and promotion of a Sikkimese 
national identity were efforts to cultivate and gamer worldwide 
39 The three main political parties in Sikkim agreed with the fundamentals of the 
system, although in varying degrees. 
40 See Cooke, p. 127. 
41 C.O. Rai expressed the sentiments of several Nepali Sikkimese I interviewed: 
"What did our administration do to perpetuate the communal angle? They divided the 
seats between the Bhutia-Lepchas and the NepaJi Sikkimese. Once divisions were 
created, they remained .... We were constantly reminded that we were Nepali-and 
not Bhutia-Lepcha. In order to create a unified Sikkim, you have to wipe out all these 
divisions, but our government devised means to keep us divided. It was a strategy," 
interview, April 10,2001. 
42 Sikkim Herald, vo!. 9, no. 59, May I, 1968. 
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awareness of Sikkim's distinct political identity. In Sikkim the 
spectrum of meanings for "distinct political identity" ranged from more 
autonomy in internal affairs and foreign relations at one end, to 
complete independence from India at the other end.43 In some circles 
there was talk of Sikkim achieving a political status like Bhutan (which 
lobbied for and finally gained a seat in the United Nations in 1971), if 
not Nepal. No matter where politicians, civil servants, well-educated 
citizens, and Palace officials positioned themselves on that spectrum, 
the Indo-Sikkim Treaty came to be viewed, in the words of Sikkimese 
pol itician and writer Lal Bahadur Basnet, as the "fetters that bound 
Sikkim.,,44 While it is true that signing the treaty had affirmed Sikkim's 
identity and a degree of international personality, many Sikkimese now 
believed that treaty revision was essential: it would protect Sikkim 
from Indian hegemony and amplify its international personality in the 
mind's eye of the world community. In certain circles, constitutional 
comparisons between Sikkim and the "princely states" of India still 
lingered. The Chogya! and others wished to invalidate those 
associations-and the notion that India could absorb Sikkim whenever 
it chose.45 
Momentum for treaty revision grew in the early 1960s and 
intensified after the coronation of the Chogya\ in 1965. A "study 
forum" of younger senior government bureaucrats, a large subset of the 
"intelligentsia" referred to earlier, was formed ostensibly to facilitate 
distribution of development funds from India to Sikkim. The study 
forum was also used as a venue to informally vet issues of treaty 
43 Extreme demands for treaty revision often appeared as editorials in the 
patriotic fortnightly newspaper. Sikkim. Its editor. Kaiser Bahadur Thapa, was an 
ardent nationalist: "Revision of the 1950 treaty there must be, and in keeping with the 
present-day trend, not only should our treaty be revised but it should also be 
registered with the United Nations Organisation. If our rights are not given to us 
gracefully, we are prepared to get it anyhow. But in doing so let us hope that we will 
not be driven in the extreme so that we are compelled to repeat the underground Naga 
story." Sikkim, Gangtok, August 6, 1968, as quoted in Datta-Ray, p. 137. 
44 L.B. Basnet, p. 143. Some Sikkimese I interviewed used revealing metaphors 
to describe Sikkim at this point in its national development. One informant compared 
Sikkim to a bird "ready to spread its wings." Another said: "What are you when 
you're a protectorate? ... You're a ward, and you have a guardian. After some time, the 
ward is going to grow up. We thought we were growing up, and the government of 
India thought otherwise and made us a member of their family!" 
45 Rustomji, p. 65. 
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revision and Sikkimese nationalism.46 In May 1967, the Chogyal 
announced at a Palace press conference that his country's goal was 
political freedom at "the convenience of government of India" and 
through "mutual discussions.'.47 One month later, representatives from 
the three main political parties in Sikkim serving as executive 
councillors issued a joint statement declaring that "[ s ]ince Sikkim 
signed the Treaty with India surely it is within her sovereign right to 
demand the revision of the Treaty as one of the signatories .... Every 
country has its inherent right to exist and maintain its separate identity 
and, therefore, to review and revise its treaty obligations in the wake of 
changing circumstances.,,48 Although the Chogyal publicly repudiated 
their statement when pressured by the government of India, one year 
later during Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's official visit to Sikkim, he 
spoke of Sikkim as earning its "rightful place in the comity of nations" 
in his welcome address.49 
While various groups in Sikkim were pushing for treaty revision, 
symbols of sovereignty-the national flag and anthem, and the Sikkim 
Guard-were developed and integrated into state functions with the 
goal of projecting Sikkim's distinct identity. The national flag, a banner 
of white with a crimson border and a yellow eight-spoked chakra, or 
wheel of righteousness, in the center, had been in use since 1950 but 
became omnipresent after the coronation. 50 The Sikkim Guard, "a 
company-strength unit traditionally recruited from the Bhutia-Lepcha 
community," was expanded to a company twice the usual size, with 
nearly half Nepali Sikkimese.51 The national anthem of Sikkim, "Why 
46 CD. Rai interview, April 24, 2001. The Chogyal's exact role in the study 
forum has been disputed. Because its members were government officials, it is 
reasonable to expect his implicit, if not direct, support of its activities. 
47 Datta-Ray, pp. 137-38. An article from the Times of India published in the 
Sikkim Herald, the official publicity organ of the Palace, quotes the ruler's thoughts 
on treaty revision as " ... barring defence, leave the rest to us," ("Man in the News: 
The Chogyal of Sikkim," vol, 8, no. 60, September 14, 1967). 
48 Sikkim Herald, June 16, 1967, as quoted in P.R. Rao, Sikkim: The Story of Its 
Integration with India (Delhi: Cosmo, 1978), p. 25. B.B. Gurung, one of the 
executive councillors and now retired and serving as political advisor to the chief 
minister, told me, " We didn't like the word 'protectorate.' We didn't like the legacy 
of the British. We wanted independence to run our affairs, like Bhutan, ifnot Nepal," 
interview, March 29, 2001. 
49 Sikkim Herald, vol. 9. no. 61, May 7, 1968. 
50 Keshab Chandra Pradhan, interview, March 28, 2001. 
5l Leo Rose, "Summary Technical Report: The Defence and Security System in 
Sikkim," p. 2. For an overview of the development of the Sikkim Guard in the I 960s, 
see Rose, "India and Sikkim: Redefining the Relations," pp. 40-42. After 1960 the 
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Is Denzong [Sikkim] Blooming So Fresh and Beautiful?," was set to 
music so that it could be played by a band of the Sikkim Guard.52 
These symbols of sovereignty were integrated into official events. For 
example when Indira Gandhi visited Sikkim in May 1968, she was 
received on the helipad at the Palace, where the Sikkim Guard 
"sounded out the national anthem of India and the host country." The 
prime minister then inspected a guard of honour presented by the 
Sikkim Guards. Nine hundred alternately spaced flags of India and 
Sikkim lined the route of her motorcade.53 
There were cultural efforts, too, aimed, according to one insider, at 
"keeping Sikkim in the public eye.,,54 The Gyalmo had succeeded in 
revitalizing Sikkimese handicrafts through the Palden Thondup Cottage 
Industries Institute. Careful attention to design, materials, and quality 
had resulted in Lepcha-inspired textiles, vegetable-dyed carpets, hand-
made paper, clay and wood-carved masks, and Newari-like silver 
jewelry sold in Sikkim, India, and New York. In 1966 the Asia Society 
in New York established a "Sikkim Council." In 1967 a Sikkimese 
delegation of "Tibetologists" led by the queen mother of Sikkim 
travelled to Moscow, Leningrad, and Ulan Ude to examine Tibetan 
Buddhist collections in museums and libraries. In 1968 Sikkimese 
artists and citizens attended the World Craft Council meeting in Peru.55 
And in 1971 fashion events showcasing a kaleidoscope of traditional 
clothing worn by the many ethnic groups in Sikkim were staged at a 
few upscale department stores, exclusive clubs, and museums in New 
York City and Washington, D.c.56 As world events tightened around 
Cold War politics, and Indira Gandhi's usual affection for Sikkim dried 
up, a certain urgency crept into these endeavors.57 
Sikkim-Tibet border was guarded by the Indian army, but a lone Sikkim Guard was 
posted at Natu La, one of the passes into Tibet. 
52 Rustomji, p. 90. 
53 Sikkim Herald, vol. 9, no. 6 I, May 7, 1968. 
54 Cooke, Time Change, p. 200. 
55 Rose, "Redefining the Relationship," p. 39. 
56 Cooke, p. 200. 
5? Cooke, p. 201. She writes, "We wanted people to have Sikkim in their 
consciousness. If.. .something happened, we wouldn't be quite so alone. We knew 
that they wouldn't be able or willing to help, but somehow the mere fact of people 
knowing of us seemed to diffuse the awfulness of a potential take-over and 
possibly ... keep it in abeyance." 
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A SIKKIMESE IDENTITY WITHIN THE INDIAN UNION? 
In April 1973 popular demonstrations against the Chogyal led to a 
breakdown of law and order all over Sikkim, except in the Bhutia- and 
Lepcha-dominated north district58• Several days after the collapse of his 
government, the Chogyal handed over the administration to the 
government of India. Two years later, after a surprise attack on the 
Sikkim Guards, a dubious "special poll," and an act of the Indian 
Parliament, Sikkim became the twenty-second state of India.59 The 
world community failed to rally any sustained interest in questioning 
the legitimacy of the "merger." Sikkim's experiment in creating and 
shaping a modern national identity was cut short or, as some critics say, 
failed. Yet, in the elections of 1979, six years after the demonstrations, 
the ruling party, the faction that facilitated Sikkim's annexation, lost all 
but Dne seat in the legislative assembly. Inspired by the nationalistic 
sentiments of the deposed Chogyal and promising "de-merger," Nar 
Bahadur Bhandari's Janata Parishad emerged as the ruling party. Their 
victory was anchored in opposition to the annexation and fueled by 
Sikkimese nationalism. In the intervening years, however, the tenuous 
unity demonstrated in the 1979 elections disintegrated. A society once 
split into two main political communities is today splintered into almost 
as many ethno-linguistic groups as live in Sikkim, each community 
clinging to its tribal or caste roots in the hopes of claiming economic 
and political privileges. 
Sikkim is at a crossroads. A generation has passed since the 
kingdom was incorporated into the Indian union; the number of 
Sikkimese who remember the state as a kingdom dwindles. Its 
population increases at an accelerated rate, much of the growth due to 
58 6,000 men from Lachen and Lachung converged at the north district 
headquarters in Mangan ready to travel to Gangtok to defend their king with swords 
and sticks. They were turned back by the Indian army. The Chogyal had also 
communicated to them that he would not sanction the armed resistance. See Datta-
Ray, p. 184. 
59 Many blame India for stage-managing these developments. Others argue that 
the Chogyal's political system, based on parity for the two main political groups, led 
to great disaffection among politically conscious Nepali Sikkimese·--and ultimately 
the anti-Chogyal demonstrations of 1973. For different interpretations of what 
happened, see the following: Sunanda Datta-Ray's Smash and Grab; P.N. Dhar, "The 
Merger of Sikkim" in Indira Gandhi, the 'Emergency', and Indian Democracy 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000); B.S. Das, The Sikkim Saga (Delhi: Vikas, 
1983). Leo Rose, "Modern Sikkim in an Historical Perspective." L.B. Basnet's 
Sikkim: A Short Political History covers events until just after thc 1973 
demonstrations. 
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migration from other Indian states. As if to parallel the demographic 
shift in Sikkim at the turn of the twentieth century, the majority Nepali 
Sikkimese face the possibility of becoming a minority in their own 
state in the twenty-first century.60 In light of the changed political 
circumstances and demographic realities, how might Sikkimese 
imagine and assert their regional identity-one that affirms yet 
transcends the ethnic and cultural plurality that has both handicapped 
and enriched the former kingdom? As we have seen in this examination 
of the quest for Sikkimese national identity in the 1960s and 1970s, 
there is no simple way to reconcile the conflicting requirements of a 
multi-ethnic society. Furthermore, it remains to be seen if the 
preservation and reinvention of Sikkimese identity is even a priority in 
the state. That said, in this age of the nation-state, there are multiple 
examples around the world-on the southern fringes of Russia, along 
the coast and in the mountains of northern Spain, in the northwestern 
reaches of India-where minority groups with distinct identities thrive. 
Those examples, together with an analysis of the pitfalls and successes 
of the experiment of the 1960s and 1970s, can perhaps offer guidance 
for the Sikkimese people as they traverse the twenty-first century. 
60 Article 371 F of the Indian constitution (1975) gives Parliament the power to 
reserve seats in the Sikkim state legislative assembly for various communities in order 
to protect their rights and interests. In 1975 fifteen seats were reserved for Nepali 
Sikkimese and fifteen for Bhutia-Lepchas. In 1979 the Bhutia-Lepcha seats were 
reduced to twelve. with the definition of"Bhutia" enlarged to include others groups of 
Tibetan descent. The Nepali Sikkimese seats were eliminated, thus making it likely 
that, with the mostly unchecked influx of outsiders to the state, their interests, too, 
wi 11 soon be submerged. 
